TIG Brief

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1997



Air Force Special Operations Command

TIG Brief

Dedicated to improving the Air Force

features



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The Inspector General Brief
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from the top

Operational readiness inspections now join medical readiness oversight in reducing the inspection load on units. At the January 1997 CORONA Top, Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman accepted a recommendation from his Blue Ribbon Commission on Organizational Assessments and Awards to focus operational readiness inspections more clearly on mission capability. His goal was to update the inspection's relevance to today's Air Force mission, equipment, people, and processes, while decreasing the impact on operations tempo and maintaining the inspection's role in validating unit readiness.

In response, Air Force, major command, Guard, and Reserve inspectors general worked throughout the spring on a review of the entire operational readiness inspection process. At the June CORONA Top, their efforts earned the support of numerous initiatives, many to be implemented immediately.

We are now publishing guidance. Major commands should begin instituting changes by September. Highlights include deriving operational readiness inspection scenarios directly from unit mission task lists that stress sustained performance along with surge capability, combining major command inspections and evaluating units during real-world deployments and exercises, providing much shorter deployment notice—to prevent excessive preparation—and emphasizing sampling as a means to assess capability.

These changes, along with descriptions of ongoing initiatives to "cap" inspection footprints by base and to reduce compliance inspections, are detailed in the Worldwide Inspectors General Conference article on page six. The cumulative effort of these initiatives should reduce the inspection burden on units while assuring combat readiness.

These latest initiatives are part of the continuing commitment of leadership at all levels to make it easier to be the world's benchmark Air Force.

Richard T. Swope
The Inspector General

Signature Article

The AFSOC Perspective

by Maj. Gen. Charles R. Holland

Air Force Special Operations Command is one of three component commands of the U.S. Special Operations Command. The other component commands are Naval Special Warfare Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command. This has created a very special working environment along with a special set of working relationships between these organizations. The very nature of this relationship has AFSOC forces constantly working in the joint arena. AFSOC also has units forward deployed in the European and Pacific theaters where they frequently work in the combined arena with the special forces of Allied Nations.

AFSOC forces have been involved in virtually every contingency operation since Urgent Fury in 1983; however, the AFSOC budget is less than one percent of the Department of Defense budget. Despite the limited size of the command, AFSOC units deliver quick, precise, surgical combat capability while maintaining a low profile. Therefore, we are frequently the "force of choice" for theater commanders. Having little time to train for a particular contingency operation, AFSOC units must be ready—combat ready—everyday.

The AFSOC Inspector General provides systematic evaluation of AFSOC combat units, which gives gaining commanders the assurance that, when called upon, AFSOC forces will perform as advertised.

Joint and combined operations are normal for AFSOC units; consequently, the AFSOC Inspector General evaluates the command's warriors in a joint or combined environment, often with the very units and faces they have worked with in recent contingency operations. It is not only our goal but our standard to evaluate our units in a Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise with a "go-to-war" command and control system. The historically high AFSOC operations tempo and personnel tempo drove the inspector general to the philosophy of capitalizing on previously planned exercises. The operational readiness inspection schedule for AFSOC units is predicated upon the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise structure. This avoids the addition of any additional exercises or flying events just to generate an inspection scenario for inspection purposes.

The application of the AFSOC inspection philosophy must take into account the world in which our forces are living and working, while accurately measuring unit combat readiness. This focus led to the 353rd Special Operations Group receiving their operational readiness inspection in Korea during Exercise Foal Eagle 1996. The unit was fully integrated into combined operations and command and control with Korean special forces. The 16th Special Operations Wing was inspected during Combined Joint Task Force Exercise 96-2, with full integration and evaluation of the wing into the existing command and control system. This exercise also included U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation and British Special Operations Air assets. The 352nd Special Operations Group will receive its inspection this autumn during an exercise which includes Norwegian special forces and U.S. Navy SEALS. This philosophy has saved the command many flying hours and associated funds while providing realistic scenarios for evaluation of unit combat capabilities.

The observation of AFSOC forces during a real-world contingency operation was accomplished for the first time in April 1997, when AFSOC inspectors deployed and flew with AC-130H crews in support of Joint Endeavor in Italy and Bosnia. This successful readiness observation visit was effective and caused minimal impact to the unit's ability in accomplishing its real-world mission.

The future for AFSOC units will probably be a reflection of the past few years—high operations tempo and high personnel tempo—precipitated by numerous trouble spots on our planet and a robust exercise schedule. Necessity was the "mother of invention" for the AFSOC Inspector General to perform past inspections in light of limited flying hours, funds, and the associated turbulence of high temporary duty rates.

For the future, in order to guarantee to gaining commands that AFSOC units will perform as expected, the AFSOC Inspector General will continue to develop creative methods to monitor the pulse of this command—remaining my "eyes and ears" for combat readiness.✥

Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command

1997 Worldwide Inspectors General Conference



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The 1997 Worldwide Inspectors General Conference, unlike past conferences, focused on specific tasks from the Chief of Staff-directed Blue Ribbon Commission in December 1996 and senior leadership recommendations from CORONA South in January 1997 and not on items of widespread inspector general interest. The conference served as a follow-up to a working group held in early April by major command inspectors general on operational readiness inspections. Major command, field operating agency, and direct reporting unit inspectors general were represented in order to address numerous issues surrounding operational readiness inspections. Changes were made to Air Force Instruction 90-201, *Inspector General Activities,* and Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, *Inspector General—The Inspection System*.

The major concern regarding inspections is the impact a visit has on an operational wing. Decreasing the overall "footprint" inspectors and evaluations make on the wing is the goal. The inspector general community is concerned that the operational readiness inspection used to determine a unit's readiness does not actually accomplish that but instead measures how well the unit can "peak" to meet the exercise scenario. To deter units from this episodic peaking, the commission recommended that

inspections be conducted on a short- or no-notice basis and, when feasible, have inspectors observe real-world performance for inspection "credit." Hence, short notice for Phase I inspections is 72 hours with Phase II notification left to the discretion of the major command commander.

The concern with inspecting real-world situations is the potential intrusion the inspectors may have on the operation. Therefore, major command inspectors general will scrutinize each real-world activity and decide when inspecting would be appropriate or when combining inspections with other commands might reduce the footprint. Operational readiness inspection credit may be given for actual functions adequately demonstrated during real-world contingencies.

The attendees received a briefing from the Air Force Institute of Technology on how the inspector general community could potentially use sampling and statistics to measure unit performance and thus reduce the overall inspection footprint. Experts in sampling who visited with the Air Force Inspector General this past June will do a literature review this September, visit with major commands in the fall for their input, and propose a thesis for action by early next year.

While specific change to the readiness inspection was the thrust of the conference, attendees also discussed related inspection topics including mission-essential tasks lists, compliance inspections, the gatekeeper program, and inspection caps.

Air Force mission-essential tasks lists and designated operational capability statements show where we spend our time and resources implementing our strategic plan and should be verified in the inspection scenario. Major command inspectors general will derive their inspection guidance from these tasks lists and develop exercise scenarios designed to ensure the tasks lists are fully incorporated. Updated strategic plans, due to be developed by January 1998, will be complemented by these tasks lists and determine which items should be marked critical and be inspected. Compliance items will be restricted to those deemed critical by law, directive, or Air Force instruction. The goal is to decrease the compliance inspection footprint by 10 percent in fiscal year 1998 and a total of 30 percent by 1999. In addition, units may also use improved status of resources and training systems, or SORTS, as sustained performance indicators and realize award credit for items accomplished during day-to-day operations.

The gatekeeper program has been designed to deconflict and consolidate inspections. Major command-level gatekeepers will be established and the Air Force will publish guidance on how they will interface with the Air Force level.

Inspection caps, the "ceiling" on the number of inspections any installation will receive during a period of time, affect operations tempo and personnel tempo immensely. Major commands and the Air Force will establish the maximum level of allowable visits to perform scheduled inspections, publish a cap for each installation by fiscal year, and publish Air Force-wide procedures. Inspectors will begin compiling data at the installation level and will determine the cap in October 1997.

In addition to the working group sessions, the inspector general community took the opportunity to honor the 1996 Howard W. Leaf award winner, Maj. John Emich, Air Force Space Command Inspector General, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo., at an award dinner. Each year, members of the inspector general teams across the Air Force may nominate members in the grade of lieutenant colonel and general schedule 14 and below. Emich was awarded a plaque and will have his name permanently displayed at the Pentagon.✥

Special Operations Logistics

U.S. Air Force Photo

An MH-53J being downloaded from a C-5 after air shipment.

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It's challenging to be a logistics inspector in the Air Force Special Operations Command. "Why," you ask? It's just a small command, not like Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, or the Air Force Materiel Command. Just like the other major commands, AFSOC is tasked to deploy personnel and equipment worldwide in support of exercises, contingencies, and other operations as directed by the National Command Authority. However, this is where the similarities between the commands end. The other commands, except for those with composite wings, normally deploy with only one weapon system to inspect. AFSOC units can be tasked to deploy three to six different types of weapon systems to the same location. This increases the spectrum of personnel and equipment needed to support these unique systems and increases the inspection profile. The logistics inspector has a much to consider and so does the unit being inspected.

The operational readiness inspection is just around the corner. Several questions run through your head as you consider this upcoming inspection. What is the inspector general team going to look at? How are they going to grade us? What statistics will the inspector general use to assist in determining our grade? Will they use mission capability rate, mission effectiveness, sorties flown vs. sorties scheduled, due-in-from-maintenance rate, short-tons shipped, personnel processed, or on-time take-off rate?

Measuring Capability

To accurately measure the

operational capabilities of the unit's logistics team, operational readiness inspections are accomplished in conjunction with planned exercises. This process provides for an evaluation of the unit under conditions they would see when tasked with a real-world mission. Inspection in AFSOC is a two-pronged approach, beginning with the deployment process. During this phase, the team watches how well the unit can "get out of town." A sampling of the build-up pallets provides the inspector general with an excellent evaluation of the unit's deployment process. Supply inspectors evaluate the preparation and documentation of deploying supplies and equipment to ensure accountability.

Meanwhile, inspector general maintenance personnel are watching the preparations being accomplished on the flightline and in the maintenance control center. These preparations range from helicopter tear down for deployment in a C-5 to the generation of unit aircraft. How closely is the inspector general looking? Consider some of these questions the inspectors are looking to answer:

❑ How effective is the control of maintenance operations?

❑ Are those operations being conducted safely and is their production timely?

❑ Does the crucial aircraft status information needed for decision making flow smoothly from the flightline to senior leadership?

❑ How effectively does maintenance supervision adapt to changing events?

❑ Are the aircraft being correctly configured and are aircraft generation time lines being met?

❑ Did all the tasked aircraft meet the required launch window and make scheduled closure?

As you can see, the white gloves are on, the magnifying glass is out, and the pencils are sharp. Once all aircraft have met their closure time at the deployed location, employment grading begins.

Deployed Actions

At the deployed location, the inspector general team now observes how the unit sets up operations and controls its logistics assets. Everything is evaluated, from supply's ability to provide needed parts to the accountability of assets to maintenance's preparation of aircraft for tasked missions. The maintenance complex will be observed in several key areas:

✔ Departure reliability

✔ Maintenance production management

✔ Management of resources

✔ Compliance with safety, technical, and environmental directives

✔ Aircraft and equipment condition

✔ Ability to adapt to changing events

✔ Aircraft battle damage assessment and repair, when applicable

The most important statistic factored into determining a grade is mission effectiveness. Did logistics consistently provide their customer—operations—with the assets needed to get the mission accomplished? If the mission was not accomplished in the scheduled manner, the inspector general determines the cause, whether it was a problem with supply, fuels, training, maintenance, or just plain bad luck.

The Bottom Line

The bottom line of the logistics inspection is simple—did the "loggies" provide their customers with the tools they needed to accomplish the mission, did they effectively employ all personnel and equipment, and, most importantly, did they do it safely? If the answers to those questions are positive ones, the logistics portion of the operational readiness inspection is a success. The dedication and ability of AFSOC logistics personnel ensure the command is prepared to project combat power "anytime, anywhere."✥

AFSOC Communications

U.S. Air Force Photo

Special communication operator coordinates with aircrews via secure satellite communications.

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Air Force Special Operations Command is proud to be identified as America's specialized air power. To remain "a step ahead in a changing world, delivering special operations combat power anytime, anywhere," AFSOC forces must be extremely versed in numerous missions. Providing reliable, robust communications to these specialized forces is the challenge facing AFSOC's communications experts.

To ensure the command's communications units operate at peak performance, the AFSOC Inspector General is tasked to measure operational readiness under the strenuous conditions encountered during actual special operations missions. Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises provide this realistic environment to evaluate combat capabilities, complete with a joint or combined "customer"

base and diverse mission profiles.

Missions

The command deploys forces worldwide to conduct unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, humanitarian assistance, psychological operations, personnel recovery, and counternarcotics missions. AFSOC must field, operate, and maintain state-of-the-art communications systems to ensure 100 percent mission success across this spectrum of special operations. As a result, mission needs dictate a wide range of equipment to support everything from interteam communications for a clandestine operation to large bandwidth, theater-level command and control requirements—all in a single package.

Because AFSOC is the air component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, a joint warfighting command, an additional capability is levied on their command, control, communication, computer systems. Many conventional communicators may never experience the joint and combined operations that these C^4 systems often support. To maintain interoperability with our sister services, AFSOC's communications equipment must also be capable of operating in a joint environment.

Characteristics

A small but highly motivated force of officers and enlisted personnel directly support the communications needs of six theater commanders. All of AFSOC's tactical satellite communications, HF, VHF, UHF, and light man-transportable radio communications equipment are portable and capable of providing secure voice, data, and facsimile capabilities to deployed forces.

Although the primary focus is air-to-ground communications for internal assets, resources are also extended to provide connectivity with higher headquarters agencies to include the Joint Special Operations Task Force and Joint Forces Air Component Command.

Special operations forces execute their missions in all types of conditions, ranging from arctic and jungle to desert and mountain. These extreme conditions must be mirrored by communications means that are as survivable as possible.

Determining Readiness

To accurately measure the operational capabilities of AFSOC's communications assets, operational readiness inspection deployments and scenarios are based on actual mission profiles. Operational readiness inspections are typically conducted during established Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, thus laying a realistic foundation for the communications infrastructure. This methodology forces AFSOC communicators to integrate their C^4 requirements with those of the Joint Communications Support Element, 112th Signal Battalion, and other agencies providing joint, contingency communications.

Using Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises to evaluate C^4 capabilities also provides a wide range of "customers" across the special operations spectrum. Communication needs change from day to day and mission to mission, constantly challenging the communicators to match resources and support requests for frequencies or computer security materials to meet operational missions.

Dedicated people, employing state-of-the-art equipment, provide AFSOC forces an impressive combination capable of establishing communications to meet a wide range of challenging missions. To maintain proficiency, capabilities are exercised and evaluated on a regular basis. Realistic operational readiness inspection scenarios, integrated into Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, task the units to perform their wartime capabilities, providing an accurate assessment of their ability to deploy, operate, and maintain contingency communications "anytime, anywhere."✦

Inspections Anytime, Anywhere

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The Air Force Special Operations Command is the smallest command in the Air Force but it is also one of the busiest—the force of choice—in many cases. The operations tempo in some AFSOC units is among the highest in the Air Force. AFSOC forces are literally "everywhere—all the time." So how do you inspect a racehorse, one that is constantly in full gallop? How do you do this without increasing unit commitments on an already overflowing plate?

Our philosophy at the AFSOC Inspector General is to accomplish operational readiness inspections during exercises to which the units are already committed. This allows us to measure and validate an organization's combat capability with a minimum of disruption. We are not so naïve as to think we will not cause some disruption of normal activities but using existing Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises lowers the level of pain inflicted on our units. As a relatively young major command, the inspection philosophy of minimal intrusion on our units has been one of our cornerstones from our inception as a combat command. We are interested in the end result—combat readiness. Can a unit execute its combat mission efficiently, effectively, and safely? In the special operations world, that means joint or combined operations. If you can't operate jointly or with your allies, you will fail. Nothing is done unilaterally; therefore, as inspectors, we need to see the joint or combined link up. Planning and execution are joint endeavors.

Our almost exclusive use of Joint Chiefs of Staff or joint combined exchange training exercises as an inspection vehicle provides the joint backdrop needed to obtain valid feedback for the AFSOC commander on the readiness of these special forces. These exercises see AFSOC forces supporting not only U.S. Special Operations Forces but also our NATO partners and other allies around the world. We may see British Special Boat or Air Service forces being infiltrated by an MH-60;

Norwegian Jaeger Corps or Danish Frogman Corps elements dropped from an MC-130H; Korean Special Forces inserted by an MH-53; an AC-130 gunship supporting Sustainment Forces in Bosnia, or an MC-130 providing refueling support for a joint exercise with the Indonesian Special Forces. These exercises occur around the world, from the Korean peninsula to above the Arctic Circle to south of the equator or to more mundane locations such as northeast Florida. Our forces are not evaluated employing from home station. We see them in austere locations with long, sometimes very thin, logistics lines which must deal with foreign customs regulations and language barriers among other problems.

With all the planning and coordination required to operate in airspace, we don't control, we need help. This help comes from two sources: the unit being inspected and functional augmentees from the headquarters. The unit plans the exercise just as it would if they were not being inspected. The inspector general representatives at the exercise planning conferences review the planned participation of the unit to see if it provides a vehicle for a valid combat readiness inspection. Adjustments to enhance the evaluation process are suggested by the inspector general representatives and, when possible, incorporated into the exercise scenarios. Our second source of help is functional augmentation, generally from Headquarters AFSOC. They provide functional expertise or specialization not available in the small core inspector general team.

Inspecting the "everywhere—all the time" command has led us to try some new things. We recently completed a "readiness observation visit." The visit, although ungraded, provided the AFSOC commander an unbiased observation of a unit that was preparing for, and moving into, the contingency operation supporting the implementation force in Bosnia. Through the use of a small, six-member inspector general team working from a forward deployed base, they observe and document an accurate sample of combat readiness over a short five-day time frame.

We expect to continue to grasp these types of opportunities to compensate for the blind spots associated with very high operation tempos and multiple taskings. Inspecting the combat capabilities of AFSOC forces for readiness is a challenge, a challenge that has many facets and demands employment of common sense and flexibility. The failure of AFSOC forces to execute their mission will have devastating results. Using a variety of inspection tools, we strive to identify areas needing attention and highlight the best and brightest. A continuing challenge in the "everywhere—all the time" command.✥

U.S. Air Force Photo

AFSOC forces deploy anytime, anywhere.

Ability to Survive and Operate

U.S. Air Force Photo

Maintenance personnel decontaminate an MH-60 during post-mission recovery.

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Sirens wailing, people shouting … explosions … planes, bombs, missiles …"whatcha gonna do?" Does a full-out wartime scenario seem a little distant from your paradigm? There are mysterious vehicles, muffled bangs … eerie, silent clouds, victims screaming, injured everywhere, confusion and chaos. All one needs to do is read the headlines to know the potential is there for any of the above scenarios. Are you prepared? More importantly, can you conduct your mission under these circumstances? Can you reduce follow-on casualties and live to fight another day?

Despite the decreased threshold of expected all-out combat in the post-cold war era, military operations other than war and terrorist attacks are on the increase. The Air Force Special Operations Command stands ready to be the force of choice. Proliferation of weaponry manufactured by the former Soviet Union, as well as increased sales and distribution of weapons of mass destruction from other countries, make the world more dangerous than ever. Increas-

ingly important to commanders everywhere is the ability to survive and operate in a hostile environment. AFSOC units are good at conducting their mission in a benign or safe exercise scenario. However, we must take care of ourselves, and conduct our mission, in a chemically hostile environment. Those interminable hours spent "sucking rubber" under your desk in an operational readiness exercise seem like self-inflicted punishment but what are these exercises trying to prove and what skills are they developing? Apart from your ability to get your mask on within 15 seconds, clear it, and not get too fogged up—did we mention seal the mask?—a lot of what we are exercising during simulated chemical attacks is how the command element reacts. Can you survive? Can you operate? Can the command alert, protect, and care for its personnel during and after an attack? Can it respond and conduct operations in a chemically hostile environment?

These are important issues that demand more and more of our attention, training, and emphasis. The following are important aspects of ability to survive and operate exercises and evaluations, thus allowing all Air Force—not just AFSOC—personnel to prepare and operate in an unthinkable chemical environment. What is the ability to survive and operate, and why does the inspector general specifically evaluate this environment?

Air Force Policy Directive 90-2, *Inspector General—The Inspection System*, attachment 2, defines the ability to survive as: "an operational readiness major grading area that describes a unit's ability to protect, sustain, or restore its mission capability."

Air Force Instruction 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, paragraph A5.5, asks: Are appropriate plans established and actions demonstrated to sustain, defend, survive, and recover force capability within the assigned theater of operations? In other words, can the survival recovery center survive in a hostile nuclear, biological, and chemical environment?

Were self aid and buddy care measures adequate to ensure mission accomplishment?

Are munitions storage and handling areas located where a weapons explosion, either accidental or enemy caused, will not destroy the unit's mission capability?

The AFSOC Supplement 1 to Air Force Instruction 90-201 specifically states that ability to survive and operate is: "... the actions to ensure the unit can continue to perform its wartime mission during periods of imminent or actual hostile attack. Evaluate the system to treat combat casualties, recover the wing or base in a trans-attack scenario and conserve the fighting force. The medical evaluation will be tailored to realistically support the exercise scenario."

AFSOC requires its people to be exposed to different environments, survive, and conduct their mission in these hostile conditions. One of these situations could involve chemical agents.

As stated, AFSOC is tasked to be able to survive and operate in a toxic environment. In order to do so, all of its personnel on mobility orders receive a "C bag" —groundcrew chemical ensemble—and if they are flyers, also receive a "D bag"—aircrew eyes and respiratory protection system ensemble. Members must be proficient in donning, working in, and properly doffing this equipment.

Units must ensure the following items are accomplished:

1. Everyone is required to receive annual chemical warfare defense training from the host civil engineer readiness flight.

2. Personnel should be trained on all aspects of their job while wearing their chemical ensemble, whether this is driving a vehicle, answering phones and radios, or working on aircraft.

3. Units should strive to get an individual comfortable in doing

his or her wartime job while wearing the chemical ensemble. This should be done by unit-conducted chemical warfare defense task qualification training. This type of training requires members to don the ensemble, accomplish their wartime tasks in a chemical environment, and successfully doff the ensemble without incurring further contamination.

The following are some areas the inspector general will observe:

4 How does the unit respond to the alarm conditions—yellow, red, and black or yellow, blue, and black in Korea?

5 Does the unit exhibit teamwork, positive attitudes, and a sense of urgency in dealing with alarms, warnings, and the current situation?

6 Are personnel taking cover? Is equipment donned correctly? Are personnel helping or checking each other?

7 If the unit has camouflage nets, have areas or vehicles been camouflaged to demonstrate proper camouflage, concealment, and deception procedures?

8 How are unexploded ordnance, contamination, and casualties being reported and handled?

9 Is self aid and buddy care being given to the casualties? Are casualties being transported to the casualty collection point during alarm black?

10 What procedures have the unit established for decontamination? Does the unit correctly perform decontamination of vehicles, aircraft, and personnel—individual and open air—to ensure contamination is not transferred to other people or areas? AFSOC does not expect to have everything 100 percent decontaminated. What AFSOC does expect to see is how the unit performs operational decontamination, that is, decontaminating areas in which unit personnel will come in contact. This can be done with the use of the M295 Decontamination Kit or with soap and water.

With the drawdown of forces, closing of several overseas bases, and the constant turmoil in developing nations, we have greatly increased our exposure to possible attack. We are continually faced with operating out of austere locations with the bare minimum for support. The threat to our ground personnel and flight crews is always present, and we are expected to be able to continue performing regardless of the challenges thrown our way. If the unit can successfully perform its job in a chemical environment, it will have a better chance of completing its wartime or contingency missions. Most of us know how and when to don our chemical ensembles. Problems occur in knowing how to respond, communicate, and use the proper procedures to operate in a hostile or contaminated environment. Operational readiness inspections are of short duration with the ability to survive and operate portion completed over a brief time span. How would we function if the exposure existed over a period of days? How would we eat, sleep, and take care of our personal needs? The next time you are "sent under your desk to suck rubber," take the time to think about what you would do in a real attack or terrorist situation. When the alarm clears or is reduced, can you respond without endangering yourself or your buddies and successfully conduct your mission? What is your responsibility and duty to your command infrastructure? How do you "demask," report unexploded ordnance, or take care of casualties and victims? These are but a few of the relevant topics that should come to mind the next time you are reading the headlines about a terrorist attack or the ongoing treaty negotiations regarding the chemical weapons conventions. As an Air Force member, you may not be able to avoid being a target but you don't have to be a victim!❖

COST-PER-FLYING-HOUR PROGRAM

A Foundation for Wing Cost Reduction

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Photo by Master Sgt. Fernando Serna

Since the Air Force decision to include all aircraft commodities within a centralized stock fund, aircraft maintainers and operators continue to struggle with the integration of flying operations and financial management of flying assets. The financial management of flying operations is much easier than most realize. Although the program can be very complex, reduced to its very basic levels, calculating cost per flying hour is a matter of simple mathematics and accurate documentation. The way the results are used and who these results are communicated to contribute most to the execution of the program. Good operational and maintenance skills are important in a wing's flying hour program. Equally important, though, is a successful cost-per-flying-hour program.

Establishing Your Program

Merely determining the wing cost per flying hour is not enough—a full-time program office dedicated to monitoring and reporting wing flying hour expenditures is vital to success. The scope of this article will focus on the successful program built from the ground up at the 31st Fighter Wing, Aviano Air Base, Italy. Each wing has its own unique requirements and its program must be tailored to meet wing needs. The program must be simplified without duplicating the efforts of other organizations within the wing because the primary goal is to reduce flying hour costs. Justification and validation of every flying hour expense incurred by the wing is absolutely essential. This ability to account for and portray all costs is directly proportional to the funding the major command provides the wing.

The first step is to engage the necessary personnel to provide accurate and timely information associated with flying wing aircraft costs. Program complexity and personnel's knowledge will determine the number of personnel in the office. At Aviano, four unit project fund management records are monitored; the program has three

analysts and a program manager to report extracted data. Optimally, members with strong backgrounds in supply, maintenance, and finance are recommended; however, team players with good analytical skills, a strong sense of achievement, and the ability to learn quickly will benefit the program immensely. Good communication, writing, and speaking skills also lend credibility to the program.

Managing, Monitoring, and Reporting

Again, the program's primary job is to monitor and report unit flying hour costs and the best method is through the extraction of daily costs from each individual unit's D11, a daily listing printed for the organization resource advisor or cost center manager. Aviano's cost-per-flying-hour office receives the D11 information via electronic mail. The D11 lists all the organization cost center records under each unit's project fund management record. It's used to track all depot-level reparables and consumables costs and reflects how much and which work center is spending wing flying hour funds.

Answers to taskings received will largely be provided by other organizations within the wing. Developing rapport with maintenance shops and the flightline, the local analysis section, the engine management branch, also fostering a relationship with various organizations throughout base supply including the fuels management section, unit resource advisors and cost center managers, wing financial management, maintenance officers, commanders, and other outside sources is almost as important as the monitoring and reporting of wing costs. Cultivate and use these sources to accurately report the expenditure activity of the wing. Leave the analysis to the analysts in the operations support squadron, but use their analysis to expand on cost-per-flying-hour increases and decreases. Accurate reporting is a team effort involving many different organizations which have a stake in the process.

Develop wing target levels for the various commodities, depot level reparables, consumables, and aviation fuel, using previous fiscal year performance as a baseline to build the current fiscal year program. Factor in projected weapon systems costs, commodity price changes, flying hours, deployment, and other factors. Air Force Instruction 65-503, *Logistics Cost Factors*, gives recommended costs for each commodity factor by aircraft mission design series.

Keys to a Successful Program

Program success is contingent on many variables. Training is absolutely the single most important factor in successful program execution. At Aviano Air Base, cost-per-flying-hour block training has been incorporated into maintenance training for operators, flight commander briefings, and dedicated crew chief training. A wing guide has been published, is being used as a model for command guidance, and has been submitted for Air Force-wide adaptation. Additionally, publication and distribution of a bimonthly newsletter with the latest information about the process increase audience interest and awareness. Highly trained and informed personnel make smart maintenance decisions; smart maintenance decisions result in cost savings for the wing.

Another key to program success is senior leadership commitment and support. A flying hour working group, commissioned by the wing commander and composed of members from financial management and the logistics and operations groups, meets monthly to review program issues and provide recommendations and direction. The wing commander is briefed monthly with program updates and provides valuable feedback and guidance in turn. Commitment from the top results in commitment at all levels.

Maintainers have a significant stake in the cost process. Not only must they know what the process is, they must exercise supply discipline and use of intelligent maintenance procedures. From the very beginning, many of the recommendations from the Air Force Logistics Management Agency study, Logistics Management 931581, aircraft depot-level reparable cost-per-flying-hour lessons learned were adopted at Aviano. **Following are some common sense recommendations for maintainers to facilitate depot-level reparable cost savings:**

❏ Order only the parts required to fix the job.

❏ Completely and accurately fill out all repair cycle system reparable item processing 350 tags. This facilitates adjustment of stock levels at the base and the depot. It is also the audit trail for repair at the base level and reduces time spent in troubleshooting and repair of the end item.

❏ Maintain tight control over due-ins-from-maintenance; this is absolutely critical to cost

savings. Rapid injection of parts into the repair cycle not only facilitates job completion but increases the availability of funds for additional parts repair.

❏ Take the time to develop and use good troubleshooting skills. Playing "swaptronics" with multimillion dollar aircraft, pods, and test equipment only costs more money in the long run.

❏ Use and follow published weapon system technical orders. If problems with the technical orders are identified, take the time to identify them and submit the necessary paperwork to resolve them.

❏ Exhaust all available repair capabilities prior to determining parts are not reparable this station, then order nonreparable parts immediately. Don't hold on to what can't be fixed. Valuable repair dollars are tied up and chances are this may be the only available spare in the inventory.

❏ Repair to the lowest possible level authorized by technical orders. If the repair can be taken one step further, submit a suggestion or give it to the alternate maintenance concept consolidated repair facility, Gold Flag, for evaluation.

❏ Limit cannibalizations to mission-essential components only and document all cannibalizations. Holding an item for the sake of cannibalization causes a spares shortage and adds to the cost of repairing the end item in terms of both money and workhours.

❏ Eliminate "swaptronics" between test stations because this only transfers failures from one test station to another. This maintenance practice may also forfeit long-term wing combat capability for short-term mission capability.

Cost-Per-Flying-Hour Tips to Remember

If monthly expenditures increase or remain the same and flying hours decrease, cost per flying hour will increase.

Aviation fuel is "fluid" and hard to account for. Leave the responsibility for explaining aviation fuel fluctuation to the operators—aircrew members—in the operations group.

Follow up, investigate, and correct all program inconsistencies.

Training for all personnel is the key to wing cost savings.

Ensure credits from deficiency reports are accounted for and correct but don't use them as a preferred method to reduce flying hour costs.

Smart people, coupled with smart maintenance and supply practices, equal wing savings.

Become "in tune" with available technology; graphics programs, supply data bases, and the Internet. Use technology to your advantage.

Strive to be proactive; avoid being reactive.

Know when to report and what to report. Report the news, don't make the news.

Develop and maintain a good file plan. Historic data can make or break a cost-per-flying-hour program.

Changing costly maintenance practices is the single biggest roadblock to cost-per-flying-hour success. Establishing firm mission capable status on every part without offering the back shop the opportunity to repair still occurs. Timely return of aircraft to mission capable status is essential; however, this practice effectively takes the back shops out of the repair process and contributes significantly to the cost of doing business. Firm up mission capable status requisitions after determining the shop can't make the repair. This practice will be difficult to change and is a matter of balancing chargeable-not-mission-capable maintenance time vs. chargeable-not-mission-capable supply time.

An effective cost-per-flying-hour program doesn't happen overnight. It takes months for the program to evolve into a useable tool for the wing. Count on a solid year of data collection and awareness raising before the program becomes a successful operation. Daily maintenance by personnel who know and support the program from every level, smart maintainers implementing and using efficient maintenance and supply practices, and most importantly, highly trained operations and maintenance personnel contribute to reducing wing flying hour cost. It requires time, patience, and perseverance but the wing and, more importantly, the Air Force will eventually realize efficiencies and cost savings.✥

The Heat is On

the Year 2000



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The Air Force is arguably the most technology dependent component of the U.S. Armed Services. Our ability to exploit air and space across the spectrum of conflict relies heavily on computer-based systems. Unfortunately, the Year 2000 computer problem is challenging the Air Force's capability to maintain information superiority into the 21st century. This insidious "bug" impacts the entire spectrum of Air Force systems and operations—from sensors, missiles, and aircraft; logistics, personnel, and financial systems; to infrastructure systems such as communications equipment, traffic lights, security controls, and biomedical equipment. In simple terms, failure to effectively manage the Year 2000 problem has the potential to seriously degrade Air Force mission readiness. According to Secretary of the Air Force Dr. Sheila Widnall and Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Fogleman, "... fixing the Year 2000 problem is the Air Force's top software sustainment issue."

What exactly is the "Year 2000" problem? Known as the "millennium" challenge, the problem centers around the pervasive use of two-digit data fields to specify the year in computer systems. Just as "97" represents 1997, "00" should represent 2000; however, many

computer programs will not be able to distinguish the "00" as 2000 vs. 1900. The two-digit year representation is a relic of the days when programmers conserved every byte of precious computer memory. The problem spread as the two-digit format became a "standard" form of code-writing convenience and ensured compatibility between programs and systems. To make matters worse, programs must take into account that the year 2000 is a leap year. Although technology now provides us the luxury of cheaper, more abundant memory, the two-digit year format is so widely used that all computer programs must be evaluated for two-digit fields and fixed accordingly.

The magnitude of the problem is seen in more than 2,500 Air Force software systems we are tracking and their associated 144 million lines of code. We estimate it will cost the Air Force more than $370 million to find, code, test, and implement those repairs. Not all systems need to be corrected, but all must be assessed. The Air Force plan has a five-phase resolution process: awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation.

Awareness: promoting the understanding of the Year 2000 problem at all levels.

Assessment: determine Year 2000 impact to the system and identify course of actions; if impacted, do you replace, retire, or renovate the system? Develop a contingency plan.

Renovation: Fix it; refine that contingency plan.

Validation: Complete testing and certification; finalize contingency plan.

Implementation: Place systems back into production for operational use.

We're using a "triage" strategy to make sure we correct our most mission-critical and mission-essential systems first—to ensure the Air Force retains its warfighting edge. In a nutshell, our systems must be ready by Jan. 1, 1999 so we have the rest of the year to "wring out" the fixes and further assure our computers can share and process data.

The problem doesn't end there. The fact that the Year 2000 problem impacts equipment with embedded computer chips is a real challenge—we have equipment with date functions of which we may not be aware! Examples of potentially affected systems are refrigeration, heating, ventilation, and air conditioning controls; traffic lights, gas pump counters, network hardware, security controls, telephone switch equipment, and many more. The real challenge is evaluating this huge volume of electronic equipment—the Air Force Communications Agency has a tool to do just that. They recently released a template to help bases assess and manage this problem. If you haven't seen the template, contact the Air Force Communications Agency at the address listed.

Besides the resolution process, another avenue to help us manage the impact of the Year 2000 problem is good, solid contingency planning. Every organization, at all levels, should have a Year 2000 contingency plan to address "what to do" if Year 2000 compliant hardware or software deliveries slip or fixes fail. At a minimum, the contingency plan should identify mission-critical and mission-essential systems, contacts, potential problems, and repair actions. Another consideration is the formation of response cells for mission-critical areas.

The Air Force is "turning up the heat" in solving the Year 2000 problem. We have a tight schedule with an immovable deadline. With a concerted effort at all levels, the Air Force can effectively manage and repair the Year 2000 problem. We have the right people with the right skills assessing and correcting our systems. We have a partnership with industry and other government agencies to share solutions to our challenges. Our field units are the final link in the Year 2000 resolution chain to make sure the Air Force is "mission ready" on Jan. 1, 2000.✥

For more information about the Air Force Year 2000 program, visit the Air Force Year 2000 home page at http://infosphere.safb.af.mil/~xpsm/year2000.htm or contact the Year 2000 Program Management Office at the Air Force Communications Agency, DSN 576-5697.

Investigators, Suspects, and Article 31 Rights

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The scenario is not uncommon. You have been directed by an appointing authority to investigate allegations of sexual harassment and reprisal. After reviewing the complaint, carefully framing the allegations, meeting with a legal advisor, interviewing the complainant, amending the allegations, and then interviewing several witnesses, it becomes apparent that an individual probably sexually harassed and reprised against several members in his office. You are now scheduled to interview the subject. What do you do? Investigating officers are tasked under Air Force Instruction 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints*, to investigate a wide variety of alleged wrongdoing. Common allegations include but are not limited to reprisal; sexual harassment; failure to comply with Air Force instructions; and fraud, waste, and abuse. Each of these examples of misconduct could, under the appropriate facts, constitute a crime. In our example above, sexual harassment of a subordinate can be a crime under Article 93, Uniform Code of Military Justice, if that harassment amounted to cruelty or maltreatment of a subordinate as defined by the code. However, the investigating officer will normally not be able to determine if a crime has been committed until after beginning the investigation and some initial gathering of evidence.

Inspector general investigations are administrative in nature and are generally restricted to noncriminal activities, although investigations routinely address lesser criminal misconduct. Under Air Force Instruction 90-301, paragraph 1.9.2.4., if an investigating officer discovers information leading him or her to believe misconduct of a criminal nature occurred, he or she should take no further action until consulting with the appointing authority and the staff judge advocate. The seriousness of the suspected criminal misconduct may warrant referral to a law enforcement agency, like the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Minor offenses likely to result in administrative disciplinary action may not require a formal criminal investigation, allowing the investigating officer to continue. A key point to remember is that the decision rests with the appointing authority and **not** the investigating officer.

After initial review of the facts and before you begin questioning witnesses, it would be wise to familiarize yourself with the potential violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice disclosed by the available facts. If you are questioning "witnesses," no Article 31 rights advisements are required. On the other hand, the moment you suspect someone of violating the code, even if it's in the middle of questioning, you must stop and provide that individual their Article 31 rights. If you have any suspi-

cion that a "witness" may have committed a crime, the best practice is to provide Article 31 rights advisement prior to questioning the witness. While providing someone their Article 31 rights may discourage his or her cooperation, failure to comply with the article may prevent prosecution of the offense under the code.

Simply stated, Article 31 is the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination. Article 31, broadly interpreted by military appellate courts, is actually wider in its application than the Fifth Amendment for civilians. You may notice on television police dramas that a suspect is not "read their rights," their Fifth Amendment rights—until the cuffs are on and the "custodial interrogation" begins. Under Article 31, when any person subject to the code suspects a military member of a criminal offense and they are questioning the person as a part of an official law enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry, they must give an Article 31 rights advisement. The member need not be in "custody" or "under arrest." It is formal or informal questioning in which an incriminating response is either sought or is a reasonable consequence of such questioning which triggers the requirement to read the member his or her Article 31 rights.

It is, therefore, very important to speak with a judge advocate general before beginning an investigation and whenever an investigator uncovers evidence of a crime. Article 31 prohibits using a statement obtained from a suspect in violation of the article in a trial by court-martial. The law may also prohibit using other evidence gathered based on the unlawfully obtained statement under a doctrine referred to as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." In other words, if an initial confession is tainted, the evidence derived from it can be similarly tainted. If an investigating officer ignores the Article 31 rights advisement requirement, he may prevent a member from being held accountable for criminal activity.

If the investigating officer, after talking with the appointing authority and staff judge advocate, must question a suspect, there is detailed guidance available in the *Investigation Officer's Guide*, Attachment 3, Nov. 1, 1996, published by the Secretary of the Air Force Inspector General Inquiries Directorate. It tells an investigating officer how to inform military members of their Article 31 rights, civilians of their Fifth Amendment rights, or Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard members in different scenarios of their rights. If a suspect requests a lawyer or refuses to answer questions, the investigating officer must immediately stop the interview. The investigating officer should also tell the suspect the investigation will continue whether the suspect elects to answer questions or not. Should the suspect later decide to provide testimony, it is up to him or her to reinitiate the interview. Finally, the investigating officer must ensure the suspect's refusal to answer questions is documented.

The investigating officer has a demanding job. Commanders, complainants, **and** subjects who may be unjustifiably accused depend on the investigating officer's professional and unbiased investigation. An investigating officer must tenaciously, tactfully, and accurately collect all of the relevant facts concerning allegations of impropriety or misconduct within the boundaries set by the law. When done properly, an investigation can serve the Air Force well; done poorly or contrary to regulations, it can further threaten good order and discipline. An appointment to serve in this capacity should be taken seriously and deserves your best efforts.✥

Fraud in the Air Force

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The Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigates all types of fraud cases against the government. Fraud costs the Air Force millions of dollars annually. Most of our fraud investigations are in the procurement area: product substitution, diversion, mischarging, conflicts of interest, and bribery. Other types of fraud involve military and civilian members who have been caught cheating the Air Force. In these budget-tightening days, the impact of fraud, waste, and abuse is felt throughout the Air Force and we should all accept the responsibility to prevent it at every opportunity. Mutual command and AFOSI support, coupled with teamwork, are essential for successful prevention, detection, and neutralization of fraud. Here are some examples.

Diversion of Government Property

Subject: Civilian Truck Driver
Synopsis: A commercial truck driver was arrested in connection with the disappearance of four AGM-130 missiles which were en route to Cannon Air Force Base, N.M. The training missiles, which contained no warheads or munitions, departed from Duluth, Ga., and were scheduled to arrive at Cannon Air Force Base; however, the truck and missiles never arrived. AFOSI Detachment 224 at Cannon was contacted by base officials and became the primary investigative agency for the Air Force and Department of Defense. The FBI was also notified and became the lead federal agency in the multistate search for the truck and its contents. The missiles were found intact in their original crates in a storage facility in Ranger, Texas, and were later recovered by AFOSI officials. The suspect was then apprehended by FBI officials at a truck stop in Orange, Texas.
Result: The driver pled guilty to a federal offense and awaits sentencing.

False Claims and False Statements

Subject: Aviation Parts Brokerage
Synopsis: A foreign national and three Chicago-area executives were indicted for their involvement in a scheme to resell fire-damaged aircraft parts. These parts were from a Boeing 747 and McDonnell Douglas DC-9 destroyed during the Iraqi seizure of the Kuwait International Airport in August 1990. They provided false material certifications to government buyers identifying the parts as new material. They concealed that the parts were subjected to severe stress and heat conditions from the aircraft explosions.
Result: All four parties were indicted by a federal grand jury in a 25-count indictment. If convicted, each faces a maximum penalty of five years. This, along with the specific fines and restitution, will be determined later by a federal court judge.

False Statements and Violation of the Import/Export Control Act

Subject: Electronic Components Manufacturer
Synopsis: A Department of Defense manufacturer falsely represented components used in a government contract as manufactured in the United States. Investigation disclosed they were, in fact, manufactured in Russia and the Ukraine.
Result: The company was sentenced to five years corporate probation, a one million dollar fine, and ordered to pay $230,000 in restitution to the government.✦

Summary of Recent Audits

Mr. George Mellis
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The Air Force Audit Agency provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports or a listing of recently published reports by contacting Mr. George Mellis at the number above, E-mailing to reports@af.pentagon.mil, or writing to HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125.

Flightline support equipment authorization procedures at an Air Combat Command installation were not adequate. Specifically, when establishing authorizations, equipment custodians cited incorrect allowance source codes in 24 of 72 instances. Further, 20 equipment items exceeded authorizations. Reducing these 20 excess authorizations and either canceling the associated due-outs or redistributing the excess on-hand assets would result in a one-time potential monetary benefit of $627,348. Further, citing correct allowance source codes would help ensure proper equipment accountability which, in turn, would preclude losses and help assess responsibility when a loss occurs. *(Report of Audit 50397012)*

Matching aviation fuel loads to mission requirements was required at an Air National Guard installation. While operations personnel implemented adequate management controls to properly account for aviation fuels, they did not limit KC-135 fuel loads to safety and mission requirements. When comparing actual landing fuel levels to planned levels for 126 local missions, fuel loads exceeded requirements by an average of 10,000 pounds per mission. Allowing for uncontrollable circumstances such as weather and cancellations, operations personnel could reduce overall fuel loads an average 6,100 pounds per mission, thereby reducing fuel consumption and related fuel costs of approximately $67,679 annually. *(Report of Audit 51097016)*

The frequency of base mail distribution and related costs could be reduced at an Air Force Materiel Command installation. A random survey disclosed that one delivery or pickup per day was adequate for 50 of 67—75 percent—customers vs. the current two or more deliveries. This condition occurred because the present contractor continued regular mail services at or near a level established by a previous contractor and prior to the proliferation of electronic communications. Reducing regular mail services to minimum required levels could save $90,000 annually at this installation. (*Report of Audit 40597054)*

Runway costs paid to a local airport by an Air National Guard unit could be reduced. Our review disclosed that negotiators did not follow proper guidance when the unit entered into a new agreement with the local civilian airport. Specifically, the negotiation process did not incorporate actual data on the proportionate Air National Guard use at the airport. Further, the negotiators did not require an offset to the price for the cost of fire protection that the Guard unit provided to the airport. By successfully renegotiating these issues with airport management, the Air National Guard could have saved $351,000 over the next three years. *(Report of Audit 26197013)* ❖

Status of Forces

Considerations in Planning for Air Force Activities Overseas

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Status-of-forces agreements play a vital role in preserving command authority, guaranteeing fair treatment of individual service members, and conserving scarce resources. Consequently, an important first question to ask in planning an Air Force operation or activity overseas is whether an agreement exists. Your servicing legal office can help you answer this question. How to proceed in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement is a separate matter requiring a decision at the highest policy level.

Status-of-forces agreements are not basing or access agreements. Rather, they define the legal status of U.S. personnel and property in the territory of another nation. The purpose of such an agreement is to set forth rights and responsibilities between the United States and the host government on such matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction, the wearing of the uniform, the carrying of arms, tax and customs relief, entry and exit of personnel and property, and resolving damage claims.

For example, a status-of-forces agreement will contain a provision specifying the circumstances in which each nation may exercise criminal jurisdiction. As a minimum, these agreements uniformly provide that the United States—and not the foreign government—has the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel for offenses arising out of the performance of official duty. In this way, the U.S. government ensures that its officers and employees remain accountable only to it for the way in which they perform their functions and duties. In those agreements that give host nations primary jurisdiction over some offenses, other than official duty, Department of Defense personnel are protected by fair trial guarantees, including provision of defense counsel, interpreters, trial observers, and prison visits. Similarly, relief from taxes and customs duties conserve limited defense dollars. Claims provisions provide for prompt payment to third parties who have suffered loss or injury as a result of U.S. military activity, but within a formula of checks and balances that protects against excessive claims while maintaining good host nation relations.

Status-of-forces agreements generally come in three forms. These include administrative and technical staff status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, commonly referred to as A and T status; a “mini” status-of-forces agreement, often used for a short-term presence, such as an exercise; and a full-blown, permanent status-of-forces agreement. The appropriate arrangement is dependent upon the nature and duration of U.S. military activity within the host country, the maturity of our relationship with that country, and the prevailing political situation in the host nation. Specialists who work status-of-forces agreement issues within the Air Force, the office of the secretary of defense, and the department of state are available to help make this assessment and to assist in negotiating any necessary agreements.

Today’s world is a complex one. Not only do we continue to station forces at fixed bases in Europe and in the Pacific, but we are pursuing initiatives that include access arrangements to support force projection and the Partnership for Peace program. Other initiatives, which were previously used, are being pursued with greater intensity—foreign military sales, exercises, individual and unit exchanges, and visits. In addition to traditional military operations and humanitarian relief efforts, we are now engaged in new undertakings such as drug interdiction and U.N. peace operations.

A decade ago the U.S. had permanent status of forces agreements with approximately 40 countries. Today the number has grown to more than 90 which means the U.S. has agreements with 46 percent of the more than 190 nation-states comprising the world community. The U.S. government and the Department of Defense has devoted considerable attention to these agreements over the past few years. For any overseas activity, whether an access arrangement, peacekeeping, military exercise or foreign military sales case, unit exchange or aircraft visit, careful thought should be given to the questions of what status-of-forces agreement arrangements exist and what additional arrangements are necessary. Your servicing legal office is a good place to start answering these questions.✥

survey results

TIG Brief Magazine is the 1997 winner of the El Conquistador Award presented by the New Mexico Public Relations Society of America. The magazine won in two categories—Magazine, Government and Special Topic Publication, Government. Your interest and comments helped us to achieve this award.

Thanks to all our readers.

-TIG Brief Staff

TIG Brief, as stated in Air Force Instruction 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*, "provides essential inspection-related information to commanders, staffs, and established inspectors general." To ensure we continually provide that information to our readership we conducted our biannual survey in conjunction with the January-February 1997 issue of the magazine.

Overall, we are still targeting a mature audience with 15 or more years of service—half are commanders and half are not—and 42 percent are officers. The quality, variety, timeliness, use of color, and layout were rated good or excellent by more than 70 percent of our responding readership. An overwhelming majority—79 percent—*do not* view the magazine on-line, but most receive and read it bi-monthly as published. Most of the responders indicated they read more than half of the magazine and often found the articles of value in their work center. Because responding readership chose crossfeed as their favorite section, look for the return of this regular department in future issues. We also queried our readership for recommended improvements. A sampling of those responses follows.

What recommended improvements would you make to *TIG Brief* Magazine?

"None. This was the first time I accessed the TIG Brief on-line and I must say that I was thoroughly "wowed." Excellent graphics and layout. Congratulations! Please continue to publish."

"Trash it."

"More inspection, more auditors, more jail time. Good reviews."

"Discontinue it—it's not value-added."

"Start highlighting trends in compliance. Inspections in the Air Force seem to be "soft-shoeing," the reason for the return to compliance inspections. Reduce the quality focus."

"It's the best Air Force magazine out there. Keep it up."

"Maintain Legally Speaking!"

"More "how-to-do" articles, less on theories. Discuss inspection results at various bases, making sure trends are noted. Discuss inspector general high interest items more. Discuss current education trends such as "Covey training." Thanks."

"You have a good magazine, it's just that many articles don't always pertain to everyday items down on the enlisted level."

"I regularly scan for publication and reproduce—with credit—specific articles for my orders clerks and their commanders. I really find your publication very easy to read and extremely useful to use and apply to the real world. Thanks!"

Please *Recycle*

Serving U.S. Airpower for 54 years